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A growing body of literature argues that democracies are more likely to comply with 
international agreements than authoritarian states. However, substantial variation 
exists in the compliance behaviour of democracies. How can this variation be 
explained? The same mechanism that links regime type to compliance, namely 
electoral competition, also explains variation in compliance amongst democracies. 
This is because the nature of electoral competition varies across democratic systems. 
An analysis of democratic GATT/WTO member countries from 1980 to 2003 reveals 
that countries with majoritarian electoral rules and/or single-member districts are 
more likely to violate GATT/WTO agreements than those with proportional electoral 
rules and/or multi-member districts. 
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A growing body of literature argues that democracies are more likely to comply with 
international agreements than authoritarian states (e.g. Gaubatz, 1996; Mansfield, 
Milner and Rosendorff, 2002; Smith, 1996). Such arguments often point to the 
deterrent effect of democratic elections. Voters are believed to punish leaders who 
violate international agreements by voting against them in the next election. This 
makes it costly for democratically elected leaders to breach international agreements; 
doing so reduces their chance of staying in office (McGillivray and Smith, 2000). 
Electorally minded leaders in democratic states therefore comply with international 
agreements to maximize their chances of re-election, according to conventional 
wisdom. The implication is that democratic states violate international agreements 
less frequently than authoritarian states.  
However, significant variation in compliance behaviour exists amongst 
democracies. While some consistently comply with international agreements, others 
habitually violate them. In fact, the most frequent violators of agreements negotiated 
within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are high-functioning 
democracies with strong, credible opposition parties and regular competitive 
elections. This poses a puzzle for existing theories of democratic compliance, 
particularly those that place primary importance on the deterrent effects of 
competitive elections. If elections deter non-compliance, as conventional wisdom 
suggests, why do some democratically elected leaders violate international 
agreements more often than others?  
A possible explanation is the significant variation in electoral competition that 
exists amongst democratic states. This variation is a result of the different rules used 
to elect leaders. In majoritarian systems, politicians need 50 percent plus one of the 
votes in their electoral district to win (re)election; parties need to win a majority of the 
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districts to win control of the legislature. This engenders candidate-centred electoral 
competition where narrow interests have substantial political influence (e.g. Carey 
and Shugart, 1995; Persson & Tabellini, 2003). In contrast, proportional electoral 
rules (PR) engender party-centred competition. In these systems, parties work to 
maximize their share of the national vote because this determines the number of 
legislative seats the party will control. This variation in how democratic leaders are 
elected may help to explain why some democracies violate international agreements 
more often than others. 
Virtually all international agreements have distributive consequences that 
make some voters better off and others worse off (Tomz, 2002). For example, the 
World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
restrict the use of subsidies by member-country governments. Subsidies targeted to 
individual industries or firms are explicitly banned by Articles 1 through 9.i These 
restrictions are intended to increase economic efficiency and reduce costs to 
consumers. Consumers, who constitute a large segment of countries’ populations, 
benefit from compliance with these rules. In contrast, narrow segments of the 
population, like domestic producers, lose out from compliance. Producers including 
individual firms and industries would like to be able to earn rents from lucrative 
government subsidies. They would prefer that their national government violate these 
rules. Non-compliance with this international agreement benefits narrow producer 
groups; it serves their own self-interest. 
This is an important point – one that has been largely overlooked in existing 
studies of international compliance. If voters’ preferences over compliance with an 
international agreement vary, the effect of democratic elections on compliance is 
ambiguous. The impact of democracy will depend critically on the electoral incentives 
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facing politicians and voter support for compliance. If, for example, compliance with 
an international agreement benefits broad-based groups, like consumers, then 
politicians in proportional rule countries have relatively greater electoral incentives to 
comply with the agreement. This is because the best electoral strategy for politicians 
and parties in proportional rule systems is to appeal to broad segments of the 
population in order to maximize the party’s vote share (e.g. Carey and Shugart, 1995; 
Persson & Tabellini, 2003). Vote share determines the number of seats a party will 
control in the country’s legislature. By maximizing its vote share, a party maximizes 
its power in the legislature and its chances of being in government. This implies that 
amongst democracies, those with proportional electoral rules are relatively more 
likely to comply with international agreements that benefit broad segments of a 
country’s population, such as the GATT/WTO restrictions on narrow transfers. 
In contrast, democracies with plurality (or majoritarian) electoral rules are 
relatively more likely to violate GATT/WTO restrictions on narrow transfers. By 
providing narrow transfers, politicians can target benefits to constituents in their 
geographically-defined district thereby increasing their chances of re-election (e.g. 
Persson & Tabellini, 2003). Parties competing in two-party majoritarian systems can 
use narrow transfers to target benefits to key electoral districts.ii In this way, the 
provision of narrow transfers maximizes the chances of electoral success for parties 
and politicians competing in majoritarian systems. The implication is that 
democracies with majoritarian electoral rules are more likely to violate GATT/WTO 
restrictions on narrow transfers, as compared to proportional rule democracies. 
Instances of non-compliance with GATT/WTO restrictions on narrow 
transfers amongst democratic member countries from 1980 to 2003 are analyzed here 
to assess the empirical validity of this argument. Consistent with expectations, 
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majoritarian democracies are found to be more likely to violate GATT/WTO 
restrictions on narrow transfers, as compared to proportional rule democracies, 
holding all else equal. This finding is robust to the inclusion of numerous control 
variables and model specifications.  
The main theoretical implication of this research is that the effect of 
democracy on compliance with international agreements is conditional rather than 
direct. The consequences of democratic accountability depend critically on a 
country’s electoral institutions and voters’ interests. Democracy makes compliance 
more likely when a state’s electoral institutions privilege those voters that prefer 
compliance. In contrast, democracy makes compliance less likely when electoral 
institutions advantage voters that favour non-compliance. This provides a possible 
explanation for the previously unexplained variance in compliance behaviour amongst 
democratic states. The same mechanism that links regime type to compliance, namely 
electoral competition, also explains variation in compliance amongst democracies.   
This research has important theoretical implications for several of the key 
debates in International Relations including, for example, the degree to which the 
causes of international political and economic trends are to be found at the domestic 
or international level (Frieden and Lake, 2000). While some International Relations 
scholars rule out explanations of international phenomena by reference to internal 
characteristics of the nation-state (e.g. Waltz, 1979), others argue that national 
concerns can override global considerations. This research supports the latter view. A 
democratic state’s compliance with international agreements depends critically on two 
key internal characteristics: electoral institutions and voters’ preferences over 
compliance. Both the state (i.e. political institutions) and society play a significant 
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role in countries’ foreign economic policies, international relations, and compliance 
with international agreements.  
The reminder of the paper is organized in six parts. Section 2 briefly discusses 
the GATT/WTO restrictions on narrowly targeted transfers. Sector 3 lays out the 
theoretical argument as to why some democracies violate international agreements 
more often than others. Section 4 describes the empirical tests of the theoretical 
expectations derived in the previous section. The results of the empirical tests are 
discussed in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes the paper.  
Context 
Restrictions on narrow transfers have long been the focus of multilateral 
negotiations because they are believed to cause significant economic distortions. As 
early as the Tokyo Round of 1979, narrowly targeted subsidies were regulated by 
GATT Articles VI, XVI and XXIII.iii Since then, restrictions on narrow transfers have 
been strengthened and expanded. The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (Articles 1 through 9) explicitly bans government subsidies 
targeted exclusively to individual industries or firms. The use of narrowly targeted 
transfers is implicitly restricted by other GATT/WTO agreements that require general 
reductions in trade barriers and open market access. Under GATT/WTO agreements, 
member country governments are expected to refrain from privileging domestic 
producers via narrowly targeted transfers and/or trade barriers. 
Countries that choose to provide narrowly targeted transfers in violation of 
GATT/WTO rules risk being filed against at the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body. 
This entails potentially significant costs including international sanctions, the costs of 
participating in a GATT/WTO dispute, reputation costs, and the costs of 
compensating a plaintiff if ruled against by a Panel. Despite these costs, some 
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governments choose to provide narrow transfers in violation of GATT/WTO rules. 
For example, the United States’ government imposed 30 percent tariffs on steel 
imports in March 2002. Within a few days, the European Union lodged a formal 
complaint with the World Trade Organization alleging that such tariffs were illegal. In 
November 2003, the WTO ruled that the American tariffs were illegal. Subsequently 
China, the European Union, and Japan announced their intent to levy costly retaliatory 
sanctions against the United States (Mahncke, 2004). 
Why would a democratically elected government choose to violate 
GATT/WTO rules and risk costly international sanctions? Existing compliance 
theories provide little insight. Democratic governments are generally expected to 
comply with international agreements. Two key arguments are advanced in the 
literature for why this may be the case. First, democracies may comply with 
international legal obligations because they share an affinity with prevalent 
international legal processes and institutions (e.g. Dixon, 1993; Slaughter, 1995). 
Second, democracies may comply with international agreements because failure to do 
so entails costs for elected leaders (e.g. Leeds, 1999; McGillivray and Smith, 2000). 
This argument rests on the critical assumption that voters punish leaders for violating 
international agreements by voting against them in the next election.iv Given these 
arguments, how can the United States’ decision on steel tariffs be explained and, more 
generally, the variation in compliance behaviour amongst democratic states?  
Theory 
Democratically elected governments violate international agreements when the 
electoral benefits of doing so outweigh the domestic and international costs. The 
domestic costs of providing an illegal narrow transfer include the actual budgetary 
costs of the transfer, the opportunity costs of funding the transfer rather than some 
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other policy, and the potential economic distortions caused by the transfer.v The 
international costs of non-compliance include reputation costs and the potential costs 
of international sanctions. For example, extra duties (i.e. countervailing duties) can be 
imposed against illegally subsidized products. Such duties decrease the 
competitiveness of exports from defendant countries. Additionally, participation in the 
dispute settlement process entails resource costs, such as the financial, institutional, 
and human capital costs of litigating a dispute (Guzman and Simmons, 2005). 
Additionally, governments must consider the potential costs of compensating the 
plaintiff if ruled against by a GATT/WTO Panel. 
Governments implement WTO-inconsistent policies when the electoral 
benefits outweigh these costs. This is demonstrated by the United States’ steel tariffs. 
During the course of the US presidential election campaign in 2000, George W. Bush 
promised to help the steel industry in Ohio and West Virginia in an attempt to win 
votes in these key states. With the November 2002 midterm elections for the House of 
Representatives finely balanced, the Republicans needed to win the key steel-
producing states of Ohio and Pennsylvania (Read, 2005: 135). The US tariffs on steel 
were an attempt by the Republican administration to win electoral support in key 
states (Read, 2005). The electoral benefits of providing this illegal narrow protection 
for the Republican Party appear to have outweighed the domestic and international 
costs of violating GATT/WTO rules.  
This illustrative example makes an important point; not all voters punish 
leaders for non-compliance with international agreements. Some voters will, in fact, 
reward leaders for violating international rules, as was the case in the key steel-
producing states of Ohio and Pennsylvania. This point challenges a fundamental 
assumption in the domestic audience cost literature, namely that all voters value 
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compliance and therefore punish leaders who violate international agreements. When 
voters’ preferences over compliance vary, the expected effect of democratic elections 
on compliance is ambiguous.   
Democratically elected governments will provide illegal narrow transfers 
when the electoral benefits of doing so are substantial (i.e. when they outweigh the 
costs). The electoral benefits of providing an illegal narrow transfer are more likely to 
outweigh the costs when politicians compete for (re)election under majoritarian 
electoral rules in single-member districts. This is because of the unique nature of 
electoral competition in countries with these electoral institutions, as demonstrated 
formally by theoretical models of electoral competition (e.g. Lizzeri and Persico, 
2001; Milesi-Ferreti et al., 2001; Persson and Tabellini, 1999, 2000, 2003).  
In such models, politicians and parties are assumed to be office-seeking. They 
want to maximize their chances of re-election and to this end work to provide benefits 
to those voters most critical to their re-election chances. The identity of these voters is 
determined by the country’s electoral rules. In majoritarian systems, the most 
important voters for a politician’s re-election chances are those in the politician’s 
geographically-defined electoral district. Politicians need 50 percent plus one of the 
votes in their electoral district to win (re)election in majoritarian systems. To secure 
this outcome, politicians will work to provide narrowly targeted benefits those voters, 
firms, and industries located in their district (e.g. Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Milesi-
Ferreti et al., 2001; Persson and Tabellini, 1999, 2000, 2003).  
This incentive also exists for parties competing in two-party plurality rule 
systems with single-member districts. In these systems, parties win control of the 
legislature (and executive) district by district. To maximize their chances of winning 
control, strategic parties target narrow transfers to key electoral districts. Because 
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politicians and parties can use narrow transfers to target precisely those voters whose 
support they need to win re-election, these types of transfers are uniquely valuable in 
democracies with plurality electoral rules.vi  
Plurality electoral rules tend to be closely associated with single-member 
electoral districts. This empirical regularity provides further incentives for electorally 
minded politicians and parties to provide narrow transfers. Single member districts 
tend to be smaller than multimember districts (Powell and Vanberg, 2000). This 
increases the influence of narrow, particularistic groups over elected representatives 
(e.g. Alt and Gilligan, 1994; Magee et al., 1989; Mansfield and Busch, 1995; 
McGillivray, 2004; Rogowski, 1997).  McGillivray (2004: 28) provides the following 
illustrative example: An industry with 100 employees represents 10 percent of the 
electorate in a district with 1,000 voters. The same industry represents only 0.1 
percent of the electorate in a district of 100,000 voters. In the larger district, refusing 
to protect the industry is unlikely to affect the politician’s re-election chances because 
the industry is only 0.1 percent of the representative’s electorate. In a district of 
100,000 voters, political representatives are forced to balance the interests of a greater 
variety of industry groups. Given this, politicians elected via the smaller districts that 
typically characterize countries with single-member districts have greater incentives 
to provide narrowly targeted transfers to their constituents.vii  
District size has been suggested as a possible explanation for the apparent 
protectionist bias in majoritarian countries. For example, Magee, Brock and Young 
(1989) argue that larger electoral districts minimize the electoral incentives to provide 
trade protection.viii Although the argument made here might be seen as a simple 
extension of existing arguments in the trade protection literature, a key question 
remains as to whether majoritarian democracies will provide WTO-inconsistent trade 
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protections. Governments can (and do) provide protection from international trade in 
ways that do not violate GATT/WTO rules. For example, many countries’ tariffs are 
set well below GATT/WTO limits. Governments interested in providing protection 
can do so by raising tariffs up to the agreed limit. Only by raising tariffs above this 
level do countries violate GATT/WTO agreements. Why would countries choose to 
provide illegal protection in violation of international agreements? This question is 
fundamentally distinct from the general question of why countries provide protection. 
The argument made here suggests that governments choose to provide illegal narrow 
transfers in violation of international agreements when the domestic electoral benefits 
of doing so outweigh the costs. This is more likely to occur in plurality rule 
democracies where narrow transfers provide unique and important electoral benefits 
to politicians facing competitive democratic elections.  
In proportional systems, politicians and parties have fewer electoral incentives 
to supply narrowly targeted transfers, even in the absence of international restrictions 
(e.g. Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Rogowski, 1987, 1997). 
Parties competing under proportional electoral rules do not win elections district by 
district. In fact, no single district is critical to the electoral success of a party 
(McGillivray, 2004). Instead, parties work to maximize their aggregate vote share 
because this determines the number of legislative seats the party will control.ix By 
targeting transfers to broad segments of the electorate, such as consumers, parties are 
able to “buy” the electoral support of a wide range of voters dispersed across electoral 
districts. This is precisely the type of electoral support that is most beneficial to 
parties competing in multi-member districts under proportional rule. Because 
narrowly targeted transfers provide relatively fewer electoral benefits to politicians 
competing in proportional rule systems, PR democracies are less likely to violate 
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GATT/WTO rules on targeted transfers than plurality rule democracies, holding all 
else equal. The following section describes the empirical tests of this theoretical 
expectation. 
Data and methods 
Compliance with standing, substantive rules embodied in international agreements is 
difficult to measure. Using instances of non-compliance rather than compliance is a 
straightforward way to overcome this difficulty.x Complaints filed with the 
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Body over illegal narrow transfers are used to 
measure instances of non-compliance.xi The dependent variable is the cumulative 
number of complaints filed against a democratic GATT/WTO member country over 
illegal narrow transfers in a given year (Complaints).  
A vast majority of GATT/WTO complaints are filed in response to an illegal 
narrow transfer in the defendant country.xii This is confirmed by the fact that the 
majority of all cases decided by a GATT/WTO Panel yield a victory for the 
complainant country (Guzman and Simmons, 2005). Both developed and developing 
country complainants win approximately 90% of WTO cases (Guzman and Simmons, 
2005). This suggests that the variable Complaints is a valid measure of non-
compliance. In an attempt to further increase the validity of this measure, 
GATT/WTO complaints that are explicitly political in nature and do not have at issue 
an illegal narrow protection are systematically excluded from the sample. For 
example, the 1985 complaint filed by Nicaragua against the US in response to the 
trade embargo imposed by the Reagan Administration is excluded. Excluding these 
types of complaints increases the validity of this measure. Additional coding criteria 
and sample restrictions are discussed in the appendix.  
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Despite the restrictive coding criteria, it is possible that some complaints 
included in the sample were not filed in response to illegal narrow protection. These 
cases, if they exist, are ‘false positives’ (i.e. a complaint is observed where no 
violation exists). This type of error will make it relatively more difficult to find 
evidence in support of the argument made here.  
This variable likely underestimates the frequency of non-compliant behaviour 
because not all instances of non-compliance engender a formal complaint. Filing a 
complaint entails costs for the plaintiff country. As a result, countries file complaints 
only in select cases. A vast literature examines when and under what circumstances 
countries chose to file a GATT/WTO complaint. For example, Davis and Shirato 
(2007) argue that the characteristics of the affected export industry in the complainant 
country determine when WTO complaints are filed. Davis and Bermeo (2007) show 
that the complainant country’s domestic institutions and litigation experience play a 
critical role in the country’s decision to file a WTO dispute. Bown (2005) shows that 
export stakes and retaliatory capacity account for much of the cross-national variation 
in dispute initiation.  
These studies and others suggest that the decision to file a complaint is not 
random. Although the decision is not random, it is unlikely to be influenced by a 
defendant country’s electoral rules. Plaintiff countries are no more likely to file 
against a majoritarian country with an illegal protection than a proportional country 
with an illegal protection.xiii This is an important point. It suggests that any systematic 
relationship found between a country’s electoral rules and the number of complaints 
filed against it is unlikely to be the result of selection bias.  
Given the discrete and non-negative properties of the dependent variable, it is 
appropriate to use an event count procedure to model the process underlying non-
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compliance with GATT/WTO restrictions on narrow transfers. The negative 
binominal model is used here because the count variable is overdispersed.xiv The 
negative binomial model allows for this overdispersion and includes parameters for 
unobserved variance in the number of disputes across countries (King, 1989; Long, 
1997).  
One might argue that the zero inflated negative binomial model may be more 
appropriate for this analysis given that the modal number of disputes in any given 
country in any given year is zero. However, the large number of zeros in the count 
variable may be the result of unobserved heterogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998; 
Long, 1997). Unobserved heterogeneity can cause both overdispersion and an 
increase in the proportion of zeros. The negative binominal model can account for the 
ovedispersion and the excess zeros in the raw data. The negative binominal model 
responds to the under prediction of zeros in the Poisson regression model by 
increasing the conditional variance without changing the conditional mean (Long, 
1997). In contrast, zero modified count models change the mean structure to explicitly 
model the production of zero counts. This is done by assuming that zeros can be 
generated by a different process than positive counts. However, the theory advanced 
here does not suggest that the zeros are generated by a different process. Given this, it 
is difficult to justify theoretically the use of the zero inflated negative binomial model. 
Estimating a zero-inflated negative binominal model does not produce dramatically 
different results.xv In fact, no significant bias appears to be introduced by estimating 
the more theoretically sound negative binominal model rather than the zero-inflated 
model. 
The sample is an unbalanced panel of democratic GATT/WTO member-
countries with yearly observations from 1980 to 2003. These data are used in a pooled 
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time-series cross-section analysis with country-years as observations. The causal 
mechanism specified in the theoretical argument makes monadic predictions; 
governments in countries with majoritarian electoral rules and/or single-member 
districts are more likely to implement WTO-inconsistent policies than governments in 
PR countries. As a result, majoritarian democracies are more likely to be named as 
defendants in GATT/WTO complaints than proportional rule democracies. The most 
appropriate unit of analysis for testing the empirical validity of this hypothesis is 
monadic country-years.xvi  
The WTO replaced GATT as the organization overseeing the multilateral 
trading system during the sample period (1995). Given this, a dummy variable coded 
one for years during the WTO regime and zero otherwise is included in all estimated 
models. xviiixvii The base model also includes several addition control variables.  
Countries with majoritarian electoral rules tend to have relatively larger economies, 
on average. If a defendant’s market size influences a plaintiff’s decisions to file a 
formal complaint, as suggested by Gruzman and Simmons (2005), then a spurious 
correlation between majoritarian rules and complaints may exist. To minimize 
concerns of a spurious correlation, defendant’s market size measured by the country’s 
GDP is included as a control variable in all estimated models.xix  
Plaintiff, a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the country filed a complaint with 
the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Body in the previous year and 0 otherwise, is 
included to account for the possibility that some complaints are filed in retaliation for 
previous complaints (Busch and Reinhardt, 2002).  
Exports, calculated as the amount of goods and services exported as a percent 
of GDP, is also included. International scrutiny of a country’s compliance with 
multilateral trade agreements likely increases as a country’s exports grows. xx  
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GDP per capita is included to account for the fact that developed countries 
have historically used the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures more often than 
developing countries.  
The yearly rate of economic growth (Economic growth) is included to account 
for the possibility that politicians in countries experiencing low or negative growth 
rates may face greater pressure to violate GATT/WTO rules. Violating international 
restrictions during times of adverse economic conditions may not entail the same 
reputation costs as doing so under normal economic conditions would (Drazen, 1997).  
Although these control variables are not unrelated, standard tests show 
acceptable levels of multicolinearity.xxi Their inclusion in a single model does not 
introduce undue bias. The results of the estimated models are reported in Table 1 and 
discussed in the following section.  
Results 
Amongst democracies, the variation in compliance with GATT/WTO agreements can 
be explained, in part, by electoral institutions. Electoral institutions are robust 
predictors of non-compliance, as reported in Table 1.
xxiii
xxii  In Models 1 through 4, a 
country’s electoral rule is measured using a simple dummy variable coded one if a 
majority or all of the seats in the lower (or only) legislative chamber are elected via 
plurality electoral rules and 0 otherwise.   The effect of a country’s mean district 
magnitude is estimated in Models 5 through 8.xxiv Given the close correspondence 
between electoral rules and district magnitude, the two variables are not included 
together in the same model.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Amongst high functioning democracies,xxv majoritarian electoral rules 
significantly increase the probability of violating GATT/WTO restrictions on narrow 
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transfers. Moving from a PR system to a majoritarian system increases the likelihood 
of non-compliance by nearly 7 percentage points in a single year. This effect is 
estimated using simulations via Clarify Software (King et al., 2000; Tomz et al., 
2001).xxvi On average, the expected number of violations in majoritarian democracies 
is 300 percent higher than in proportional rule (PR) democracies. 
Democratic countries with single-member districts are also more likely to 
violate GATT/WTO rules regarding the provision of narrow transfers. Moving from 
an average sized multi-member district (i.e. one with 7 seats) to a single-member 
district system increases the probability of non-compliance by more than 6 percentage 
points in a single year. On average, the expected number of disputes in democratic 
countries with single-member districts is 186 percent higher than in multi-member 
districts.  
When the sample is expanded to include a broader group of democratic 
countries,xxvii majoritarian electoral rules remain a robust predictor of non-
compliance, as reported in Models 3 and 4. Their estimated effect is slightly lower, 
however. Changing from a PR system to a majoritarian system increases the 
likelihood of non-compliance in a given year by nearly 4 percentage points. Mean 
district magnitude remains negatively related to non-compliance but no longer reaches 
conventional levels of statistical significance in the larger sample.  
Given the frequency with which the Unites States has been involved in 
GATT/WTO disputes, readers might be concerned that the results reported here are 
driven by the inclusion of the United States in the sample. However, this does not 
appear to be the case. When the United States is excluded, as in Model 2 Table 1, the 
estimated effect of Majoritarian actually increases slightly and remains statistically 
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significant at the 0.01 level. Mean District Magnitude also remains statistically 
significant but its effect is slightly smaller, as reported in Model 6 Table 1.   
Electoral institutions remain robust to a number of additional 
specifications.xxviii For example, both Majoritarian and Mean District Magnitude 
remain statistically significant when country size is measured using population rather 
than GDP. Alternative lag structures matter little for the estimated coefficients for 
Majoritarian and Mean District Magnitude. This is perhaps unsurprising given that 
these two variables change only very rarely over time.  
Several other interesting findings deserve mention here. The WTO indicator 
variable is positive and significant in 4 of the 8 models, namely those estimated using 
the larger sample. This finding is consistent with previous studies that point to an 
increase in the number of cases filed under the WTO regime (e.g. Petersmann, 1997). 
Country size and income are also statistically significant in the more inclusive 
sample of democracies. Larger countries and those with higher per capita income are 
relatively more likely to violate GATT/WTO rules, all else equal. This may be 
because larger, richer countries are less sensitive to the international costs of non-
compliance. Alternatively, it may be that countries are more likely to file against big, 
rich defendants because there are relatively greater benefits to be gained from these 
cases (Gruzman and Simmons, 2005). This confirms the importance of controlling for 
country size. This is particularly important when estimating the effect of electoral 
rules on non-compliant behaviour. If large countries are more likely to be filed against 
and they are more likely to have majoritarian electoral rules, a spurious correlation 
between electoral rules and complaints may exist. However, by including measures of 
country size in all estimated models, the possibility of finding a spurious correlation is 
minimized.xxix 
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Conclusion 
Conventional wisdom suggests that democracies are more likely to comply with 
international agreements than autocracies. However, substantial variation in 
compliance behaviour exists amongst democracies. To date, this variation has gone 
largely unexplained. This article offers a possible account for the observed variance in 
compliance with GATT/WTO agreements among democracies. In a world where 
democracy is spreading, it is especially important to understand democratic states’ 
compliance with international agreements.  
Amongst democracies, variation in compliance with international agreements 
can be explained in part by electoral institutions. Democratic countries with 
majoritarian electoral rules violate GATT/WTO restrictions on the use of narrowly 
targeted transfers, such as industry-specific subsidies, more frequently than countries 
with proportional electoral systems. This is because majoritarian rules provide 
politicians with electoral incentives to supply transfers to narrow, select segments of 
the country’s population. This incentive derives from the winner-takes-all 
characteristics of majoritarian electoral rules and the nature of electoral competition in 
single-member districts. In contrast, proportional electoral rules and multi-member 
districts generate incentives for politicians and parties to target benefits to broader 
segments of the electorate. As a result, governments elected via proportional rules are 
more likely to comply with GATT/WTO restrictions on narrowly targeted transfers as 
these restrictions tend to benefit consumers.  
Although this research focuses on compliance with a particular international 
agreement, the theoretical implications are relevant for virtually all international 
agreements. This is because virtually all international agreements have distributive 
consequences that make some voters better off and others worse off. Consider, for 
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example, an international environmental agreement. Although such an agreement 
generates benefits for many (perhaps all) citizens, it entails substantial costs for some. 
For example, producers using environmentally unfriendly technologies will find 
international environmental agreements costly. The theory advanced in this paper 
suggests that when such groups are critical to leaders’ electoral success, leaders will 
be less concerned with (and committed to) compliance with international 
environmental agreements. This may explain, for example, the United States’ refusal 
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  
Because virtually all international agreements have distributive consequences, 
some voters will prefer non-compliance. Democracy may therefore make compliance 
less likely. The effect of democracy on compliance depends critically on the political 
importance of voters that favour non-compliance. When a state’s democratic 
institutions privilege ‘non-compliance voters’, violations of international agreements 
will be more likely. In contrast, when electoral institutions privilege those voters that 
favour compliance, democracy will make compliance more likely. In sum, the effect 
of democracy on compliance is conditional on a country’s electoral institutions and 
the interests of voters.  
This provides a potential explanation for the observed variation in compliance 
behaviour amongst democracies. It also provides a possible reason for the mixed 
empirical evidence found to date on the effect of regime type on compliance. While 
some studies show that democracies honour their international commitments more 
regularly than authoritarian states (e.g. Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2002), 
others find either a negative or a negligible correlation between democracy and 
compliance. For example, Remmer (1998) finds little evidence of a positive 
relationship between democracy and commercial cooperation. Simmons (2000) finds 
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that amongst those countries that joined the International Monetary Fund before 1980, 
democracies showed a greater tendency to violate international commitments. The 
theory advanced in this paper suggests a possible explanation for these mixed findings 
and an important avenue for future research. To better understand the effect of regime 
type on compliance with international agreements, we must develop and test theories 
about which voters prefer non-compliance and when they are likely to be electorally 
decisive. This research takes an important first step in this direction. 
This research makes several additional contributions. First, it demonstrates 
that WTO-inconsistent policies are neither random nor uniform across states. The 
supply of potential cases (i.e. WTO-inconsistent policies) is often taken as exogenous 
in studies of GATT/WTO disputes (e.g. Davis and Shirato 2007).xxx However, this 
research suggests that to fully understand the pattern of GATT/WTO disputes, one 
must account for the likelihood of a WTO-inconsistent policy in the defendant state. 
This depends in part on the country’s electoral institutions.  
Second, this research confirms the increasingly common claim that 
majoritarian democracies are relatively more protectionist than proportional rule 
democracies (e.g. Evans, 2009; Grossman and Helpman, 2005). The novel result 
reported here is that governments in majoritarian systems are willing to protect 
domestic producers even when doing so violates their international obligations. The 
theoretical implication is that national electoral concerns can at times override 
international considerations. This speaks to the ongoing debate in International 
Relations over the degree to which the causes of international political and economic 
trends are to be found at the domestic or international level. This research 
demonstrates the importance of domestic politics for compliance with international 
agreements. It appears that the nation-state remains a powerful and independent actor 
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whose internal structures shape foreign economic policy and international relations, 
despite the dramatic increase in international interdependence and the proliferation of 
international agreements. Kindleberger’s (1969) pronouncement that ‘the nation-state 
is just about through as an economic unit’ appears to have been premature. 
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Table 1: Negative binominal model of non-compliance with GATT/WTO  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 Complaints Complaints Complaints Complaints Complaints Complaints Complaints Complaints 
         
L.Majoritarian 1.425*** 1.578*** 0.585* 0.598*     
 (0.46) (0.46) (0.32) (0.32)     
L.Mean District Magnitude (log)     -0.527*** -0.508*** -0.203 -0.188 
     (0.17) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) 
L.Plaintiff 0.410 0.384 0.358 0.380 0.410 0.542 0.397 0.462 
 (0.33) (0.38) (0.29) (0.34) (0.34) (0.37) (0.29) (0.33) 
WTO Regime 0.245 0.152 0.793*** 0.850** 0.360 0.198 0.775*** 0.789** 
 (0.32) (0.39) (0.29) (0.35) (0.32) (0.38) (0.29) (0.35) 
L.Exports (log) -0.373 -0.00666 -0.895** -0.733** -0.597 -0.331 -0.881** -0.716* 
 (0.46) (0.47) (0.37) (0.36) (0.48) (0.47) (0.38) (0.37) 
L.Economic Growth (log) 0.184 0.0654 0.207 0.152 0.0608 0.0342 0.157 0.128 
 (0.29) (0.32) (0.24) (0.28) (0.29) (0.32) (0.24) (0.28) 
L.GDP (log) 0.486*** 0.453*** 0.429*** 0.435*** 0.452*** 0.528*** 0.450*** 0.490*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.100) (0.10) (0.13) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13) 
L.GDP Per Captia (log) 0.457* 0.272 0.440*** 0.355* 0.491** 0.420 0.468*** 0.402* 
 (0.25) (0.28) (0.16) (0.19) (0.23) (0.28) (0.17) (0.21) 
Constant -20.14*** -18.57*** -16.39*** -16.24*** -17.25*** -19.40*** -16.62*** -17.60*** 
 (5.23) (5.36) (3.00) (3.29) (4.68) (5.59) (3.39) (3.74) 
         
Observations 571 556 748 733 557 542 713 698 
# of Countries 40 39 54 53 40 39 53 52 
Alpha (log) -1.631 -1.028 -1.330 -0.293 -2.099 -0.852 -1.562 -0.329 
 (1.67) (1.80) (1.33) (0.92) (2.34) (1.61) (1.55) (0.95) 
Mcfadden's Pseudo R-squared  0.27 0.18 0.23 0.15 0.27 0.18 0.22 0.15 
Sample Polity > 8 Polity > 8 Polity > 6 Polity > 6 Polity > 8 Polity > 8 Polity > 6 Polity > 6 
USA included  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A: Details on the coding of Complaints  
The variable Complaints measures the cumulative number of disputes filed 
against a country alleging the existence of an illegal narrow transfer in a given year. 
Complaints filed over other issues are systematically identified and excluded. These 
include: (1) complaints over broad transfers and/or policies that affect a wide range of 
goods, producers, or industries, like, for example, the 1982 dispute over the value 
added tax (VAT) threshold; (2) complaints related to the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights; (3) complaints filed against the European Community/European 
Union unless it is very clear which EC/EU member the complaint was filed in 
response to; (4) complaints related to anti-dumping measures because anti-dumping 
measures are imposed in response to a foreign firm’s policy rather than a foreign 
government’s policy; (5) complaints that are explicitly political in nature like, for 
example, the 1985 complaint filed by Nicaragua against the US in response to the 
trade embargo imposed by the Reagan Administration. Complaints over 
countervailing duties are included only after carefully examining the GATT/WTO 
Panel Reports to correctly identify the country initially accused of having an illegal 
narrow transfer. Complaints filed by multiple countries over a single illegal narrow 
transfer are counted only once against the defendant country. Two independent coders 
identified the set of relevant disputes using these coding criteria. The percentage 
agreement between the two coders was approximately 98 percent.  
 
  
 
                                                 
i There are, of course, exceptions. For example, agriculture is largely exempt from 
these restrictions.  
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ii A debate exists in the literature as to whether parties target swing districts or safe 
districts. See, for example, Cox and McCubbins (1986), Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) 
and Dixit and Londregan (1996). For this paper, the distinction is not critical. Both 
arguments point to the importance of providing benefits to narrow, geographically-
defined constituencies in majoritarian systems. 
iii Changes in negotiation rules implemented during the Kennedy Round (1964-67) 
may, in fact, be viewed as the first attempt to limit narrowly targeted benefits. Under 
the new rules, linear reductions in tariffs were negotiated rather than item-by-item 
reductions. 
iv Another theory argues that democracies are relatively less likely to provide trade 
protections (e.g. Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2000; Milner and Kubota, 2005). 
Although the reasons given for this vary, the expectation is that democratically elected 
leaders have fewer incentives to provide protection than autocratic leaders.  
v Additionally, voters that favour compliance may vote against leaders that violate 
international agreements in the next election thereby imposing ‘domestic audience 
costs’ (Fearon, 1994). 
vi This has been suggested as a possible explanation for the apparent protectionist bias 
in majoritarian countries (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 2005; Willmann 2004). 
vii However, Karol (2007) finds no empirical support in the United States for the claim 
that larger constituencies makes politicians less protectionist.  
viii Single member districts also allow voters to assign credit for the provision of 
targeted transfers. In multimember districts, voters do not know which of their 
representatives to credit for providing targeted transfers (Ashworth and Bueno de 
Mesquita, 2006). Voters observe the total amount of transfers provided to the district 
but not the amount produced by individual legislators. This reduces the domestic 
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electoral benefits of providing narrowly targeted transfers in multi-member districts. 
As such, politicians in multi-member districts may be unwilling to work to provide 
narrow transfers in violation of GATT/WTO rules because the costs of doing are 
likely to outweigh the benefits. 
ix However, Monroe and Rose (2002) show that districting matters for partisan 
electoral outcomes in PR systems under certain circumstances.  
x Leeds (2003) takes a similar approach by examining instances of non-compliance 
with alliance commitments. 
xi Data are from Hudec (1993), Reinhardt (1996), Allee (2009) and the WTO (2005). 
The coding criteria used to identify relevant disputes are detailed in the appendix. 
Two independent researchers coded the complaints using to these criteria. The 
percentage agreement between the two coders was 98 percent. 
xii Eighty percent during the period from 1980-1994; sixty-six percent during 1995-
2003. 
xiii However, majoritarian systems tend to be more frequent in large countries. The 
size of a defendant country (or market) may influence plaintiff country’s decisions to 
file a formal complaint. To control for this, I include various measures of the 
defendant countries’ economic size in all estimated models (GDP and GDP per 
capita). I also include measures of a defendant country’s population and area in 
models run as robustness checks. Importantly, electoral rules remain a robust 
predictor of the number of GATT/WTO complaints filed against a given country 
controlling for various measures of country’s size. This minimizes the possibility that 
the positive correlation between majoritarian electoral rules and WTO-inconsistent 
policies is spurious.  
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xiv The mean value of Complaints is 0.17; the standard deviation is 0.55. Although the 
unconditional variance is greater than the unconditional mean, the dispersion 
parameter, alpha, closely approximates zero in several of the estimated models. When 
alpha is equal to zero, the negative binominal distribution is equivalent to a Poisson 
distribution.  
xv Exports are used to predict zero counts. Countries that export nothing to the global 
market arguably face little scrutiny of their domestic transfers. However, Exports is 
not a robust predictor of the incidence of zeros. Importantly, the estimated coefficients 
for the key variables of interest (Majoritarian and Mean District Magnitude) are very 
similar to those estimated using a negative binominal model; the standard errors are 
relatively lower.  
xvi Although dyadic studies have become increasingly common in the GATT/WTO 
literature, several recent papers question this trend. Rose (2008) argues that monadic 
tests may be more appropriate than dyadic tests for understanding the expected effects 
of the GATT/WTO on countries’ trade policy decisions. Similarly, Allee and Scalera 
(2009) make a strong case for using monadic rather than dyadic data to examine the 
effects of GATT/WTO accession on domestic policy. Dai (2006) illustrates the 
potential pitfalls of testing monadic theories using dyadic data.  
xvii A fully interacted model is also estimated to test for equality of coefficients across 
these two regimes. The estimated coefficients for both Majoritarian and Mean 
District Magnitude are remarkably consistent across the two regimes.  
xviii All control variables are lagged one year. Alternative lag structures were tested. 
For example, Plaintiff was lagged for two years rather than just one. However, this did 
not significantly alter the key findings.  
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xix Population and area are used as alternative indicators of size. These results are not 
reported here but are available from the author upon request. Importantly, the key 
results are robust to the inclusion of these alternative measures of country size.  
xx Data on all economic variables come from the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2005).  
xxi The variance inflation factor (VIF) is less than 4 for all variables included in the 
estimated models, as recommended by Huber et al. (1993). 
xxii These results are consistent with those reported by Davis (2008).  
xxiii These data come from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001).  
xxiv These data come from Johnson and Wallack (2005). Using a measure of mean 
district magnitude taken from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001) 
produced very similar results.  
xxv Here, the sample includes only those countries with a Polity score greater than 8. 
xxvi For countries under the WTO regime that did not file a complaint in the previous 
year. All quantitative control variables are set equal to their median values. 
xxvii Here, the sample is expanded to include all countries with Polity scores greater 
than 6.  
xxviii For example, electoral institutions remain robust predictors of non-compliance 
even when a measure of rule of law is included. Previous research demonstrates that 
countries with strong rule-of-law traditions are more likely to comply with 
international agreements (Simmons 2000).  
xxix Although countries self select into electoral rules, there is little reason to believe 
that this non-random selection biases the reported results. Countries predisposed to 
protection are no more likely to choose majoritarian electoral rules than proportional 
rules (Boix 1999). Instead, a country’s selection of electoral rules depends critically 
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on ethnic and/or religious fragmentation (Boix 1999, Rokkan 1970). Although 
fragmentation influences a country’s choice of electoral system, it is unlikely to 
influence the country’s trade policies. Thus, the possibility of a spurious correlation or 
selection bias is minimal. Further evidence of this is provided by empirical tests that 
include an indicator of the historical period during which the country adopted the 
electoral rules in use at the time of the observation. If there are historical trends in 
electoral institutions, then the period during which a country’s electoral rules were 
chosen is likely correlated with the selection and therefore the conditional-
independence assumption is more credible when this variable is included in the 
estimated model. These results are available from the author upon request. Controlling 
for the age of a country’s electoral institutions, countries with majoritarian electoral 
rules are more likely to be named as defendants in GATT/WTO complaints.  
xxx A notable exception is Allee (2009).  
